We study comovement of Chinese A and B shares (restricted to foreigners). A-B shares within firms commove surprisingly less than B-shares of different firms. Investor property rights protection (PRP), and several firms' opaqueness measures, explains these patterns. A reform allowing domestic investors into B-shares increases A-B comovement, specially for firms in low PRP cities. We offer a model with segmented markets where foreigners face information acquisition costs. In equilibrium, B-share prices are disconnected from fundamentals, lowering comovement with A-shares. Reducing market segmentation increases informed trading and A-B comovement, the more so for firms with higher initial information costs.
How do legal and economic institutions affect information efficiency and asset prices? In an influential study, Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) find that stocks in the countries with poor property rights protection (PRP) exhibit a higher degree of price comovement. They conjecture that agents from these countries have less incentive to acquire and capitalize firm-specific information, thus less firm-specific information diffuses into asset prices. In the presence of market-wide noise trader risk, higher uncertainty translates into a large price impact of these shocks, thus leading to excess comovement unrelated to fundamentals. In this paper, we theoretically formalize their intuitions and test the predictions from our model using a novel set of identifications based on the withincountry variations of local city-level PRP.
In China, 90 firms have issued both A-shares and B-shares to investors as of December 2008.
These two classes of shares have the same voting rights and cash flow rights. The only difference between these two share classes is that B-shares were available only to foreign investors before It turns out that they do not. We find a surprisingly low price comovement between A-shares and B-shares of the same issuer. In fact, the typical return correlation between A-and B-shares issued by the same firm is even lower than the average B-share return correlation between shares issued by different firms. The lack of comovement between A-B shares of the same firm is remarkably robust, regardless of the choice of sample periods, return sampling frequencies, benchmark adjustment models, and statistical methods to calculate return correlations. This is reminiscent of the classical studies of anomalous price behaviors of so-called "Siamese twin" shares of firms listed and traded on different international exchanges (see, Rosenthal and Young (1990) ; Froot and Dabora (1999) ).
As in the studies of "Siamese twin" shares, A-and B-share structure allows us to almost perfectly isolate the fundamental from non-fundamental price comovement, and identify mechanisms through which the lack of comovement may occur.
To explain the lack of comovement of A-and B-shares, we first develop a simple dynamic model of information aggregation for the Chinese A-and B-share markets. Theoretically, market segmentation introduces non-trivial correlation structures among different securities. Take for instance two classes of shares, A-share (traded by domestic investors) and B-share (traded by foreign investors), each giving rights to the same dividends of firm 1. Suppose there is another claim for dividends of firm 2, which has an equivalent market segmentation between A-and B-shares. How will the correlation structure of these four securities look like? The correlation depends on the nature of the shocks as well as the information structure in each market. Innovations in firm-specific fundamentals drives the correlation between A and B shares of the same firm, with a magnitude positively related to the amount of private information capitalized into prices. On the other hand, investor-specific shocks provide a common source of variation in asset prices of different firms held by these investors. In line with the argument in Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) , we model these innovations as correlated noise trading (supply shocks), which could be interpreted as changes in the risk-bearing capacity of a particular investor class. The price impact of noise trading however is negatively related to the amount of private information aggregated into prices, since informative prices reduce uncertainty and lower the price impact of supply shocks.
Our model delivers several immediate predictions and the most important one is that the price comovement between A-and B-shares of the same firm is lower for firms with higher information acquisition costs. 1 To better understand the effects of PRP, we study the comovement between Aand B-shares after the B-share market was partially opened to domestic investors. In our model, this is captured by allowing the informed domestic traders to freely enter the B-share market after the reform. As domestic investors enter the B-share market, the fraction of traders with firmspecific information increases, leading to higher comovement between A-B shares of the same firm.
This effect, however, is smaller for firms with lower information acquisition costs for investors. This result arises naturally in a standard rational expectation equilibrium (REE) setup in which price informativeness (the signal/noise ratio of prices) is a monotonically increasing and concave function of the mass of traders with private information. It follows that a discrete increase in the measure of 1 Jin and Myers (2006) also study cross-country price synchronicity. They provide a model stressing how lack of transparency resulting from insider expropriation leads to excess comovement. In our model, there is no insider expropriation and the market friction is mainly costly information acquisition. There is a growing body of literature that examines similar issues. For example, Fox et al. (2003) investigate the effect of mandatory information disclosure on pricing efficiency. Li et al. (2004) find that greater capital markets openness is associated with higher pricing efficiency in emerging markets, whereas goods market openness has no effect on pricing efficiency. informed traders resulting from the B-share market reform of 2001 will have proportionally larger effects among firms with higher information acquisition costs.
We empirically test the model in Chinese A-and B-share markets in both cross-sectional and time-series context. In view of our model, the key identification assumption is that the observed variation of city-level PRP captures the difference in information acquisition costs faced by foreign investors. We provide evidence that city-level PRP is indeed significantly correlated with accounting transparency proxies in firms incorporated in those cities. Moreover, our cross-sectional evidence shows that PRP at the city-level positively affects the comovement of A-and B-shares. Firms incorporated in a city with better PRP exhibit higher comovement between A-and B-shares.
Conversely, B-share comovement between different firms is higher for firms incorporated in cities with low PRP. Our evidence is in line with the results in Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) that countries with low PRP exhibit higher return comovement across different firms in excess of what can assigned to common macro-level shocks. Time-series evidence also confirms the predictions of the model. After 2001 B-shares market reform, the return comovement between A-and B-shares increases from an average of 0.494 to 0.694. Moreover, we also find that the increase in comovement is much smaller for firms located in cities with better PRP. Taken together, our empirical evidence provides strong support to the model's predictions.
While it is not the main focus of our study, our model also explains another well-known but distinct puzzle concerning the relative pricing of A-B shares, in which B-shares are traded at a discount (see, Chan, Menkveld, and Yang (2008) , among others). We show that, all else equal, the expected return (risk premium) required for holding stocks is larger in the B-share than in the A-share market, and monotonically increasing in information acquisition costs faced by foreign investors. Intuitively, larger information acquisition costs lower the fraction of foreign traders that become informed. This reduces the informativeness of B-share prices and increases the uncertainty regarding future dividends held by the average trader in the B-share market. In sum, we provide a unifying framework that relate PRP, information acquisition costs, and asset price dynamics (i.e., level and comovement of asset prices in both time-series and cross-section).
We discuss an alternative explanation, "cash flow hypothesis", which may explain our findings.
The cash flow hypothesis emphasizes the distinction between de jure cash flow rights and de facto cash flow rights. According to the hypothesis, although foreign investors should have the same cash flow rights as domestic investors on the basis of corporate bylaws and charters, local court may discriminate against foreigners. To the extent that the enforcement-based discrimination would be more severe in cities with low PRP, one would expect to see the difference in the valuation of the underlying firm. While the cash flow hypothesis can potentially explain relative valuation of A-and B-shares, it does not generate a clear prediction of A-and B-share price comovement. Moreover, when we formally test the hypothesis, we find it is related to relative pricing of A-B shares, but not return comovement.
Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, we provide the first piece of within-country firm-level evidence on the effect of PRP and transparency on return comovement. Perhaps more importantly, we are able to disentangle fundamental from non-fundamental comovement. This research design complements a large body of literature of cross-country studies. Disentangling both sources of comovement is important yet difficult, except for a few cases such as index addition, deletion, and rebalancing. However, such research design is not suited for studying the effects of PRP on asset price comovement. The prior literature analyzing this issue typically relies on variation at the cross-country level. Focusing on city-level data within the same country reduces the likelihood that unobservable institutional and cultural factors may be driving the cross-country results. Moreover, the B-shares market reform in 2001 provides an additional source of identification based on a difference-in-difference strategy.
Second, by showing that PRP matters for asset prices, our research complements Chan, Menkveld and Yang (2008) . They examine the determinants of the A-B share discount and show that measures of information asymmetry estimated using high-frequency data can explain this discount.
Yet what explains information asymmetry in the first place? Our theoretical model and empirical evidence suggest that PRP is related to information acquisition costs. By showing that variation in PRP affects A-B shares discount, we not only validate the information-based theory, but provide evidence about its driver -information acquisition costs. Our results suggest that PRP affects foreign investors' incentive to acquire information, which affects the information asymmetry between foreign investors and domestic investors. 2 Third, our paper also contributes to the broad literature that investigates the real effect of 2 See Brennan and Cao (1997) , Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999) , and Hau (2001) , Seasholes (2000) , Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) , Froot and Ramadorai (2001) , and Kang and Stulz (1997) among many others for references.
property rights in finance. Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruf (2002) show that property rights affect firm's investment decisions, in particular reinvestment decisions, even if firms are not credit constrained. Cull and Xu (2005) confirm this idea using data from China. Our results suggest that when investors are not well protected, firms tend to engage in activities like earnings management which make account numbers less meaningful to investors; this, in turn, will make the stock price less informative, which may lead to resource misallocation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I introduces the background of the equity market in China. Section II describes our model and generates the key empirical predictions.
Section III describes the data and provides some summary statistics. The main empirical analysis is presented in Sections IV and V. Section VI considers and tests an alternative explanation -the difference between de facto and de jure cash flows. Section VII concludes. Appendix A provides details of the model's solution. Appendix B reports the robustness check results.
Background of Equity Market in Mainland China
China embarked on a series of economic reforms after 1979, one of which was to partially privatize the former state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through share issue privatization (SIPs). As a result, the number of total IPOs in China, most of which are SIPs, rose from eight in 1990 to 1,551 in 2008. A typical listed firm in China has two classes of shares outstanding: non-tradable shares and tradable shares. Non-tradable shares accounts for 63% of all outstanding shares on average. They are mainly held by the controlling shareholder in blocks and they cannot trade in the secondary stock markets. There are different types of listed firms, depending on the nature of controlling shareholders. If the controlling shareholder is a private firm, we call the listed firm a privately controlled listed firm. If the controlling shareholder is a local government agency or an SOE, we call it a state-controlled listed firm. On the other hand, tradable shares, held by domestic institutional investors and individual investors, are traded in one of the two securities markets:
the Shanghai Securities Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), which were established in December 1990 and July 1991, respectively. Foreign shares, which are called Bshares, have been offered by 111 listed firms since late 1991 as a way to attract indirect foreign investment. Originally these B-shares were sold only to foreign individuals and institutions, and Mainland Chinese individuals and institutional investors could not invest in B shares due to strict regulation. These B-shares are traded on the Mainland Chinese stock exchanges in a market that is separate from A-shares. Among these B-share firms, 90 firms have also issued A-shares to domestic investors. The A-shares and B-shares of a listed firm, although are traded in different and segmented markets, are legally identical in terms of cash flow rights and voting rights. The main difference is that all transactions, dividends, and trades are quoted in foreign currencies U.S. dollars for the Shanghai B-shares and Hong Kong dollars for the Shenzhen B-shares. In the following empirical analysis, we converted prices and returns denominated in foreign currencies into prices and returns denominated in domestic currency, RMB (i.e., Ren Min Bi). On is that the Chinese regulators have been concerned about foreign exchange risk exposure of the domestic financial institutions, as well as losing control over foreign exchange rates policies (Zhao and Xu, 2000) . Overall, the B-shares market reform is best viewed as a partial market integration.
Model
We build a dynamic rational expectations equilibrium model to capture the essence of the asymmetric information problem across A and B-shares arising from the market segmentation.
Basic Setup

Firms, Dividends and Investors
There are two firms in the economy: i = 1, 2. Each firm issues two types of shares, j = A, B, for two different pools of investors: A-shares traded by domestic investors; and B-shares traded primarily by foreign investors. In line with the B-share market reform in 2001, we begin by assuming that A-and B-share markets are completely segmented prior to the reform, but that domestic investors can participate in the B-share market after the reform.
At the beginning of period t + 1, firm i pays a dividend θ i t+1 given by
whereθ is the average dividend; i t+1 ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) is a firm-specific dividend component that can be observed by traders at the beginning of period t at a cost; and 
with χ
We assume the supply innovations χ This rather general characterization of noisy supplies allows for both innovations in investorspecific characteristics (i.e., liquidity shocks or variation in risk-bearing capacity) which are likely to be at least partially correlated among investor belonging to the same class (i.e., domestic vs.
foreign), as well as firm-and share type-specific innovations. At the same time, the assumption of observability in investor-specific noise trading and unobservabilty of firm-/share type-noise retains the partially revealing property of prices as signals within a simple signal extraction problem. Proposition 1 (Asset market equilibrium) There exists a unique linear equilibrium in the markets of A and B shares of firm i, characterized by the price functions
Equilibrium
where
is informationally equivalent to price P i,A t , and p i,B t
is informationally equivalent to price P i,B t .
The standard solution method conjectures a linear price equilibrium in each market (equations (3) and (4)), for a given fraction of foreign informed investors λ i t . We then solve the implied learning problem and optimal demand functions, and find the linear price coefficients by imposing the market clearing condition. For market (i, A), this condition is given by
t . This equation makes clear that equilibrium prices in market (i, A) will be partially revealing about the firm-specific component i t+1 , since demands of domestic traders are increasing in this information. Full revelation is prevented by the presence of exogenous and unobservable trading motives η i,A t , which have price impact since domestic investors require price concessions to absorb the additional supply when they face residual dividend risk (σ 2 µ ).
The corresponding expression for market (i, B) can be written as 
Whereas price P i,A t
is always informative about i t+1 , price P with arbitrarily high costs. It also follows immediately that the value of λ i t satisfying equation (7) is unique whenever the marginal cost of information is weakly increasing is the number of traders who acquire it. 
Testable Predictions
Return comovement
Our dynamic model formalizes the prediction by Morck et al. (2000) that low PRP give little incentives to acquire firm-specific information, as firms operating in regions with opaque accounting practices (low PRP index) impose large information acquisition costs to foreign investors. This translates into lack of comovement between securities affected by the same fundamentals. The larger these costs, the lower the fraction of investors with firm-specific information, and hence the lower the comovement between A and B-type shares of the same firm. Moreover, noise trading shocks correlated across the same class of investors will induce comovement between the same type of shares of different firms held by these investors. The larger the information acquisition costs, the higher the uncertainty about firm-specific fundamentals and hence the larger the price impact of these correlated noise trading shocks. We now make these predictions explicit.
Prediction 1:
The correlation between A-B returns will be lower for firms operating in cities with low level of PRP.
Prediction 2:
The correlation between A-B returns will increase for all firms after the B-share market reform of 2001, and it will increase more for firms operating in cities with lower level of PRP.
Prediction 3:
The correlation between B-B returns will be higher for firms operating in cities with lower level of PRP.
Prediction 4:
The correlation between B-B returns will decrease after the B-share market reform of 2001, and it will decrease more for firms operating in cities with lower level of PRP. shows how the correlation between B-B shares of different firms fall after the reform is passed and market segmentation is reduced, as suggested by the first part of prediction 4.
B-share Discount
Our model predicts that, all else equal, domestic investors will demand a larger premium for holding B-shares, as the conditional variance of dividends is higher for those investors which don't purchase the information i t+1 . Chan et al. (2008) provide evidence consistent with this observation.
The model also predicts that such discount should narrow in regions with high levels of property rights protection (PRP), as foreign investors find it cheaper on average to acquire information and bring their knowledge of future returns closer to domestic investors. Specifically, we calculate the ex-ante expected returns (risk premium) of holding different types of shares as the average difference between dividends and prices, divided by average dividends, or (θ − κ A 0 )/θ for A-shares,
It is straightforward to show that whenever the risk aversion of foreign investors is at least as large as that of domestic investors, κ A 0 is smaller than κ This is also illustrated in Figure 3 by comparing the horizontal dashed line which plots the return required for A-shares, and the returns required for B-shares. The level of risk aversion is set equal between domestic and foreign investors. Moreover, κ i,B 0,t is increasing in the mass of foreign traders that become informed, and therefore decreases monotonically in the level of information acquisition costs. Intuitively, as information acquisition costs increase (i.e., PRP declines), the fraction of foreign informed traders declines. Since there are fewer traders impounding information into the share price, the informativeness of prices is reduced and the uncertainty regarding forthcoming dividends increases for foreign traders that remain uninformed. In consequence, the required premium for holding the stock goes up. We formalize these comparative statics in the following prediction about A-B share relative price: Prediction 5: The A-B share discount is positive whenever the risk aversion of foreign traders is larger or equal than the risk aversion of domestic traders, and larger for firms operating in cities with lower level of PRP.
Prediction 6: The A-B Share discount decreases after the B-share market reform of 2001, and it will decrease more for firms operating in cities with lower level of PRP.
Summary
Our entire identification strategy exploits the fact that A-shares and B-shares issued by the same firm share the same fundamentals, thus allows us to cleanly quantify A-B share comovement and A-B share relative pricing that is unrelated to the differences in fundamentals. However, when we test the return correlation between one firm's B-shares with another firm's B shares, we do not enjoy such an advantage in perfectly isolating fundamental and market level macro shocks and other observed heterogeneities. Thus in our formal empirical tests, we focus on predictions 1, 2, 5 and 6. 5
Data and Summary Statistics
Our sample consists of the 90 firms that have both A-and B-shares outstanding and are traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges that have stock price data as well as basic financial information. Information on stock price, financial statement, and corporate governance structure is obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database produced by GTA (i.e., "Guo Tai An") Information Technologies.
A measure of comovement
Following Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), we construct a non-parametric sign-based measure of return comovement between A-and B-shares issued by the same firm. It is defined as the number of times that the stock prices of A-and B-shares move in the same direction on the same day, divided by the total number of trading days in which both A-and B-shares move in either direction. 6
Specifically, for A-share and B-share of firm i, we define:
where I up = 1 if both returns are positive during a particular time period and I up = 0 otherwise; I down is defined analogously, and T A,B is the number of time periods in which both A-and B-shares stock prices move in any direction. ρ f irm (A i , B i ) is equal to zero if the two stock prices always move in opposite directions, and equals one if both stocks always move in the same direction. 7
Because emerging markets typically have high market-wide comovement (Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000)), we adjust the A-B returns comovement by subtracting the market-wide comovement for each B-share firm. Moreover, adjusting A-B share return comovement by the market-wide comovement provides a natural benchmark, which makes the comparison among different pairs of A-B shares easier to interpret. In particular, for each listed firm i, we first calculate its B-shares comovement with any other B-shares, defined as ρ(B i , B j ), as follows:
To measure firm i comovement with the market, we take the median value of the pairwise comovement between firm i and firm j, i = j, which is defined as follows:
Our key dependent variable, the market comovement adjusted for A-and B-shares comovement for firm i, is then defined as the logarithm of the one plus the difference between ρ f irm (A i , B i ) and
The logarithmic transformation ensures that values of dependent variables are not bounded within by a finite interval, and the dependent variables have better econometric properties. However, our results are not sensitive to this transformation. Finally, using Tobit models and return comovement defined in equation (9) gives us similar results as well.
We further experiment a variety of alternative definitions. For example, we calculate the mean value of pairwise comovement, the equally-weighted average of pairwise comovement, or the valueweighted average of pairwise comovement as the alternative measure of market-wide comovement for each listed firm, and our main results, reported in Appendix B are not qualitatively affected.
City-level property right protection index
The property rights protection index is taken from a survey conducted by the World Bank. In 2004, the World Bank, with the cooperation from the China National Bureau of Statistics, surveyed 12,400
industrial firms in 120 cities to evaluate the investment climate in each of these cities. Among the survey subjects, 8% are state-controlled firms, 28% are foreign invested firms, and the remaining 64% are domestic privately-controlled firms (Mako and Xu, 2006) . To quantitatively assess property rights protection in each city, the survey asks respondents the following question:
. [a]mongst the commercial or other disputes that your company was involved
with, what has been the likelihood (in terms of percentage) that your company's contractual and property rights (including enforcement) are protected?"
The outcomes from the survey are standardized to construct an index scaled between zero and one. A higher value of index means better property rights protection within the city. We adopt this index in our paper and use it to measure local city-level property rights protection. 8
We will first make several general observations about the survey before discussing its application in our context. Institutional features like property rights protections are slow moving almost by definition. Therefore, in the same spirit of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) , it is reasonable to use the 2004 survey data to proxy for property rights protection over time in China. One concern, however, is that there have been a number of reforms in China over the past decade, so property rights protection may change over time. To partially alleviate this concern, we look into an earlier round of survey of 18 cities in China conducted by the World Bank. We then compare the survey results on property rights protection from two rounds of surveys. 9 The correlation between the 8 Mako and Xu (2006) provide a detailed account of survey design, procedure, and implementation. To investigate the effect of contracting institutions on a firm's reinvestment decision, Cull and Xu (2005) use such an index from an earlier round of surveys conducted by the World Bank, which covers 18 cities in China.
9 One caveat is in place. In the earlier round of survey, there was no question specifically designed to measure the property rights protection. However, in the early survey, there was one question very close to property rights protection: risk of expropriation by government (see, Cull and Xu (2005) ).
index values of the property rights protection measures from two rounds of surveys is 0.83. In addition, when we rank these 18 cities, we find that the correlation of rankings of city-level property rights protection from two rounds of surveys is 0.81. As the World Bank surveyed different sets of firms in two rounds of surveys, this correlation is strikingly high, and it illustrates the stability of institutional features such as property rights protections. 10 We are able to match 94.4% (85 out of 90) of all firms issuing both A-and B-shares with corresponding city-level property rights protection index from the World Bank survey. The high coverage rate of World Bank survey of cities where the issuers of A-and B-shares are located is particularly comforting: it essentially eliminates potential sample selection bias. For instance, the median value of total assets for the full sample is 2.36 billion RMB, the median ROE is 5.66%, and the median independent director ratio is 23.4%. For the matched sample, the median total assets size is 2.38 billion RMB, the median ROE is 4.87%, and the median independent director ratio is 23.5%. All the differences are not statistically significant at conventional significance level.
It is worthwhile to point out that the sample of cities covered by the World Bank survey and the sample of cities used in our study are very similar. Among 120 cities covered by the survey, the property rights protection index has a mean (median) value of 0.637 (0.667) on a scale between zero and one, and with a standard error of 0.168. In our matched sample, this index has a mean (median) value of 0.638 (0.665), with a standard error of 0.168. For the sample of cities covered by the World Bank survey versus the sample of cities covered in our study, a simple nonparametric Wilcox rank test cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no significant difference between these two distributions at conventional statistical significance level. We conclude that potential sample selection bias is minimal in our sample of A-and B-shares.
Firm-level financial and corporate governance variables
From the GTA database, we collect several firm-level financial and corporate governance variables, including some standard variables such as return on equity (ROE), the percentage of independent directors to all directors, total assets (in logarithm, or log(Total Assets)), and state ownership status (State Ownership = 1, if it is a state-controlled listed firm; and 0, otherwise).
Special Profits is the ratio of non-operational profits scaled by total profits before taxes. We use Special Profits to measure possible earnings manipulation through related party transactions and other non-operational activities (see Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002) , Chen and Yuan (2004) , and Jian and Wong (2010) , among others). For example, a listed firm in China can sell assets at a huge premium to its related party (i.e., its controller or other firms controlled by the same controller), which may lead to high total pre-tax profits despite low operation profits.
Following the procedure in Calomiris, Fisman, and Wang (2010) , to construct a measure of personal political ties, we manually collected the resumes of senior managers for our 90 firms, which may be found on the website of SINA.COM (finance.sina.com.cn), a NASDAQ-listed internet content provider that provides comprehensive financial information on Chinese listed firms. These resumes provide details of career paths and, in particular, report whether the manager has served as the mayor or vice-mayor in the city where the company is located. Based on the text information, we define an indicator variable Political Connection that denotes companies that employ at least one such individual in its senior management. Political Connection equals one if the company is politically connected, and zero otherwise. at a 1% significance level, using either the t-test or the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
Discussion of Summary Statistics
In summary, the most striking pattern is that the comovement between A-and B-shares issued by the same firm is substantially lower than the average B-share correlations with B-shares issued by different firms.
The market-adjusted A-B share return comovement has considerable time-series and crosssectional variation. Table 1 alludes to the main results of the paper: the market-adjusted A-B share return comovement is strongly affected by the local property rights protection of the cities where the firm is incorporated. The mean (median) value of the market-adjusted A-B share return 11 Some readers may expect a much faster convergence after March 2001, when the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) allowed domestic investors to trade B-shares. However, Chinese domestic individual investors are not allowed to transact foreign currencies freely within the Chinese banking system. Before September 1, 2003, domestic individual investors can only buy up to $2,000 every year from the bank system, and additional purchases above this limit must be approved by the local Administration of Foreign Exchange, and purchases above $10, 000 must get approval from the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, which makes it almost impractical from an investor's perspective). After September 1, 2003, this limit was raised a bit higher to $5,000. On August 3, 2005, the government further loosened the restriction and raised the maximum to $8,000 per year. On May 1, 2006, this limit was again raised to $20,000 and then to $50,000 on February 1, 2007. In summary, the capital might have moved slowly toward the B-share market, which helps explain the slow convergence. Notes: The market-adjusted A-B share return comovement is defined as the logarithm of one plus the A-and B-shares return correlation of firm i, minus the median of B-share return correlations with other B-shares of firm j, ji. Property Rights Protection is the city-level local property rights protection index value based on the World Bank Survey (2006). Log(GDP Per Capita) is the time-series average of inflation-adjusted city-level gross domestic product per capita in RMB. GDP Growth Rate is the time-series average of inflation-adjusted city-level gross domestic product per capita growth rate. ROE is the return on equity of the underlying issuer. Log(Total Assets) is the logarithm of the value of total assets in RMB. Log(Age) is the logarithm of the firm age since the founding date. Log(Turnover Ratio) is the logarithm of the A-shares turnover ratio to B-shares turnover ratio. Return Difference is the difference between A-share annual returns and B-share annual returns. Independent Director is the ratio of independent directors to all directors. State Ownership is the proportion of shares held by the state and state legal persons to total shares outstanding. Special Profits is the ratio of non-operating profits to total profits. Political Connection is an indicator variable denoting that the firm has at least one senior officer who was ever a mayor or vice mayor of a city (see Calomiris et al. (2010) ). Firm-level control variables are all the time-series average values over the corresponding period. Panel A reports the summary statistics for the full sample; Panel B reports the summary statistics by levels of property rights protection of the city where the firm is incorporated; and Panel C reports the summary statistics by two subsample periods, 1992 to 2000 (before opening the B-share market to domestic investors), and 2001 to 2008 (after opening the B-share market to domestic investors). comovement is −0.12 (−0.14) for firms incorporated in cities with weaker property rights protection, and −0.07 (−0.08) for firms incorporated in cities with stronger property rights protection.
Interestingly, compared with firms incorporated in cities with weaker property rights protection, firms incorporated in cities with stronger property rights protection seem to have higher return on equity (0.03 vs. −0.02), a lower likelihood of being controlled by the state (0.26 vs. 0.29), a lower fraction of non-operational profits to total profits (0.19 vs. 0.58), and weaker political connections (0.08 vs. 0.20). Firms incorporated in cities with strong and weak property rights protection do not differ significantly in terms of total asset size, age, and ratio of independent directors to the number of total directors. There is no significant difference in industry composition between these two subsamples (untabulated).
Our identification assumption is that PRP affects information acquisition costs. If firm-level transparency measures as more opaque accounting or managerial practices increases information acquisition costs, we expect to observe firms from cities with lower level of PRP should be less transparent. The above summary statistics are consistent with this observation. To explore this relationship more formally, we estimate the following two regressions: Table 2 shows that PRP is negatively related to both Special Profits and Political Connection,
i.e., in cities with lower PRP index, firms are more likely to be politically connected and they are more likely to be involved in earnings management via related party transactions. Thus these results provide indirect but consistent evidence that lower level of property rights protection (PRP) is likely to be associated with higher information acquisition costs.
Local Property Rights Protection and Return Comovement
In this section, we first present the full-sample evidence relating property rights protection and firm opaqueness to the A-B share return comovement. Then we present some robustness checks. Finally, we will present subsample evidence using the 2001 regulatory reform as an exogenous policy shock Table 2 correlates two firm-level transparency measures (special profits (column 1) and political connections (column 2)) with the level of property rights protection of the city in which the firm is incorporated. Special Profits is the ratio of non-operating profits to total profits. Political Connection is an indicator variable denoting that the firm has at least one senior officer who was ever a mayor or vice mayor of a city (see Calomiris et.al. (2010) ). Property Rights Protection is the city-level local property rights protection index value based on the World Bank Survey (2006). Log(GDP Per Capita) is the time-series average of inflation-adjusted city-level gross domestic product per capita in RMB. GDP Growth Rate is the time-series average of inflation-adjusted city-level gross domestic product per capita growth rate. ROE is the return on equity of the underlying issuer. Log(Total Assets) is the logarithm of the value of total assets in RMB. Log(Age) is the logarithm of the firm age since the founding date. Log(Turnover Ratio) is the logarithm of the A-shares turnover ratio to B-shares turnover ratio. Return Difference is the difference between A-share annual returns and B-share annual returns. State Ownership is the proportion of shares held by the state and state legal persons to total shares outstanding. Firm-level control variables are all the time-series average values over the corresponding period. The sample period is from 1992 to 2008. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, disturbance terms clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote the coefficient estimates significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
that affects the composition of investors in the B-shares market. Table 3 presents the main results of the paper by estimating the following regressions:
Full Sample Evidence
In all regression specifications, the dependent variable is the time-series average market-adjusted A-B share return comovement between January 1992 and December 2008, and the main variables of interests include the local property rights protection index of the city where the firm is incorporated, and two variables capturing the effects of firm opaqueness: non-operational profits to total profits and firm-level political connections. All regressions include industry-fixed effects. (1) through (7), Property Rights Protection takes a continuous value. In columns (8) and (9), Property Rights Protection takes a value of one if the property rights protection index value is above the median value in the cross section, and zero otherwise. Reform is an indicator variable taking a value of one for all observations after 2001, and zero otherwise. Log(GDP Per Capita) is the time-series average of inflation-adjusted city-level gross domestic product per capita in RMB. GDP Growth Rate is the time-series average of inflation-adjusted city-level gross domestic product per capita growth rate. ROE is the return on equity of the underlying issuer. Log(Total Assets) is the logarithm of the value of total assets in RMB. Log(Age) is the logarithm of the firm age since the founding date. Log(Turnover Ratio) is the logarithm of the A-shares turnover ratio to B-shares turnover ratio. Return Difference is the difference between A-share annual returns and B-share annual returns. Independent Director is the ratio of independent directors to all directors. State Ownership is the proportion of shares held by the state and state legal persons to total shares outstanding. Special Profits is the ratio of non-operating profits to total profits. Political Connection is an indicator variable denoting that the firm has at least one senior officer who was ever a mayor or vice mayor of a city (see Calomiris et.al. (2010) ). Firm-level control variables are all the time-series average values over the corresponding period. The sample period is from 1992 to 2008. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, disturbance terms clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote the coefficient estimates significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Regression in column (1) The regressions in columns (3), (4) and (5) relate some corporate governance attributes the fraction of independent directors and state ownership status, the A-B share return difference and relative liquidity, and firm-level characteristics (return on equity, size, and firm age) to the marketadjusted A-B share return comovement. Interestingly, the logarithm of firm age is negatively correlated with the A-B share return comovement and significant at a 1% significance level. One interpretation of the result is that firm age captures firm opaqueness. Among the listed Chinese firms, older firms are more likely to be firms traditionally owned by the state or local government, which are plagued by convoluted organizational, structural, and ownership problems. These problems collectively increase the firm opaqueness, thus making them particularly costly for investors to value and contributing to the lower return comovement.
Column (6) collects all firm-level variables and regresses them against the market-adjusted A-B share return comovement. The adjusted R-squared of this regression is 0.51. Among the set of firm-level variables, the logarithm of firm age, Special Profits and Political Connection remain statistically significant at a 1% level or higher. Taken together, these variables indicate that it is reasonable to argue that firm opaqueness contributes to the low return comovement between A-B shares.
Compared with the regression specification in column (6), the regression in column (7) adds the city-level local property rights protection, GDP per capita in logarithm, and GDP growth rates.
City-level local property rights protection remains statistically significant at a 1% level, and it largely retains its economical magnitude as well. The point estimate decrease from 0.162 in column
(1) to 0.117 in column (7) In regressions (1) and (7), the city-level local property rights protection index takes continuous values between zero and one. As a robustness check, we also consider a discrete specification of the city-level local property rights protection. Specifically, we create a dummy variable, which equals one for all cases in which the property rights protection index value is below the cross-sectional sample median, and zero otherwise. As shown in columns (8) and (9), this discrete specification of the city-level local property rights protection delivers very consistent results in both statistical and economic significance. For example, after controlling for firm-level characteristics, on average, a firm incorporated in a city with an above-median property rights protection index value has an A-B share return comovement of 0.0439, or 0.878 (=0.0439/0.05) standard deviation higher than a firm incorporated in a city with a below-median property rights protection index value.
In summary, Table 3 shows that local property rights protection as well as firm-level opaqueness contribute to the A-B share return comovement. Though local property rights protection and firmlevel opaqueness are related, one does not completely assume the other. It suggests that firm-level opaqueness may be one channel whereby local property rights protection affects the information acquisition of investors, and consequently affects the A-B share return comovement.
Robustness Check
To check the robustness of the results presented in the previous section, we consider several alternative definitions of the A-B share return comovement. These alternative definitions differ along several dimensions. The first dimension is the return sampling frequencies -daily returns vs. weekly returns. Weekly returns further address concerns about market microstructure induced noise. The second dimension is about the adjustment model-the mean or median correlation with other B-shares, or with other A-shares, or without adjustment of its comovement with the market.
The third dimension is the method of calculating return correlations -sign-based versus Pearson correlation coefficients.
Appendix B of the paper reports the results based on some of these alternative definitions of the A-B share return comovement. In each of these alternative specifications, city-level local property rights protection is always statistically significant at a 5% level or higher. Among the two firm-level opaqueness measures, Special Profits is always statistically significant at a 5% level or higher for all specifications, whereas Political Connections is statistically significant at a 10% level or higher for four out of six specifications. Overall, it is fair to say that applying alternative specifications of the A-B share return comovement does not significantly affect the main results of the paper.
Subsample Evidence
In this section, we consider a regulatory reform that allows domestic individual investors to access the B-share market beginning February 19, 2001. The regulatory change provides a unique opportunity to study the following two issues. First, the entry of domestic individual investors on average introduces market-wide information, which was only relevant to domestic investors (i.e., A-share market information). The aggregation of A-share market information into B-share prices should increase the average comovement between A-and B-shares. Second, stocks with relatively small information acquisition costs due to stronger property rights protection and less firm opaqueness will have stock prices aggregating more firm-specific information. The entry of domestic investors, and their associated information sets, becomes less important. Therefore, after partial opening of B-shares to domestic investors, those stocks experience a smaller increase in return comovement.
Empirical results from Table 4 are consistent with these ideas. We first estimate the regression models in a way similar to regression equation (5) (1) and (2) show that stronger property rights protection of the city in which the firm is incorporated increases the market-adjusted A-B share return comovement in Table 4 : A-B share comovement and PRP, before and after B-share market reform
Notes: The dependent variables in all regressions are market-adjusted A-B share return comovement, defined as the A-and B-shares return correlation of firm i, minus the median of B-share return correlations with other B-shares of firm j, ji. Property Rights Protection is the city-level local property rights protection index value based on the World Bank Survey (2006). In columns (1) through (4), Property Rights Protection takes a continuous value. In column (5), Property Rights Protection takes a value of one if the property rights protection index value is above the median value in the cross section, and zero otherwise. Reform is an indicator variable taking a value of one for all observations after 2001, and zero otherwise. Log(GDP Per Capita) is the time-series average of inflation-adjusted city-level gross domestic product per capita in RMB. GDP Growth Rate is the time-series average of inflation-adjusted city-level gross domestic product per capita growth rate. ROE is the return on equity of the underlying issuer. Log(Total Assets) is the logarithm of value of the total assets in RMB. Log(Age) is the logarithm of the firm age since the founding date. Log(Turnover Ratio) is the logarithm of the A-shares turnover ratio to B-shares turnover ratio. Return Difference is the difference between A-share annual returns and B-share annual returns. Independent Director is the ratio of independent directors to all directors. State Ownership is the proportion of shares held by the state and state legal persons to total shares outstanding. Special Profits is the ratio of non-operating profits to total profits. Political Connection is an indicator variable denoting that the firm has at least one senior officer who was ever a mayor or vice mayor of a city (see Calomiris et al. (2010) ). Firm-level control variables are all the time-series average values over the corresponding period. The full sample period is from 1992 to 2008. The first sample period is from 1992 to 2000; and the second sample period is from 2001 to 2008. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, disturbance terms clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote the coefficient estimates significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
both sample periods, albeit the effect is much stronger prior to the regulatory change. Prior to the regulatory reform, a one-standard-deviation increase in property rights protection increases the market-adjusted A-B share return comovement by 0.618 standard-deviations (significant at a 1% level) and by 0.250 standard deviations after February, 2001 (significant at a 10% level). Similar to the full sample evidence, more opaque firms have lower comovement.
To evaluate the interaction effect of regulatory reform and city-level local property rights protection, columns (3) to (5) estimate the following difference-in-difference specification:
The dependent variables are the market-adjusted A-B share return comovement. The regression in column (3) presents the baseline results without firm-level controls. Regressions in column (4) and (5) add firm-level controls. The difference between the regressions in column (4) and (5) is that the property rights protection index in column (4) takes continuous values, whereas the property rights protection index in column (5) is a binary variable, which equals one if the local property index value is above the cross-sectional median, and zero otherwise.
Several observations can be made from Table 4 . First, after the regulatory reform, the market- Several arguments have advanced to explain the A-B share discount puzzle. 12 In particular, Chan, Menkveld, and Yang (2008) show that information asymmetry, estimated using structural models (Glosten and Harris (1988) , Easley and O'Hara (1987) ), explains the cross-sectional variations in the A-B share discount. Since information asymmetry itself is an outcome variable, which describes the ease of acquiring and accessing information, as well as the probability of investors encountering share manipulation and insider trading, property rights protection is particularly relevant here. In our model, B-share discount arises naturally as the conditional variance of dividends is higher for B-share investors which don't purchase the information. Table 5 relates the A-B share discount to local investor protection and other firm-and city-level characteristics by estimating following regression:
Full Sample Evidence
In all specifications, the dependent variable is the time-series average of the daily A-B share discount, which is defined as the logarithm of one plus the B-share price (P i,B ) minus the A-share price (P i,A ) over the B-share price, or
Clear from the definition, the larger is the value of Discount it , the smaller is the A-B share discount. For regressions in columns (1) through (7), the property rights protection is a continuous variable; and for regressions in columns (8) and (9), the property rights protection is a binary variable, taking a value of one if the property rights protection index value of the city where the firm is incorporated is above the cross-sectional median, and zero otherwise. All regressions include industry-fixed effects. ). Property Rights Protection is the city-level local property rights protection index value based on the World Bank Survey (2006). In columns (1) through (7), Property Rights Protection takes a continuous value. In columns (8) and (9), Property Rights Protection takes a value of one if the property right protection index value is above the median value in the cross section, and zero otherwise. Reform is an indicator variable taking a value of one for all observations after 2001, and zero otherwise. Log(GDP Per Capita) is the time-series average of inflation-adjusted city-level gross domestic product per capita in RMB. GDP Growth Rate is the time-series average of inflation-adjusted city-level gross domestic product per capita growth rate. ROE is the return on equity of the underlying issuer. Log(Total Assets) is the logarithm of the value of total assets in RMB. Log(Age) is the logarithm of the firm age since the founding date. Log(Turnover Ratio) is the logarithm of the A-shares turnover ratio to B-shares turnover ratio. Return Difference is the difference between A-share annual returns and B-share annual returns. Independent Director is the ratio of independent directors to all directors. State Ownership is the proportion of shares held by the state and state legal persons to total shares outstanding. Special Profits is the ratio of non-operating profits to total profits. Political Connection is an indicator variable denoting that the firm has at least one senior officer who was ever a mayor or vice mayor of a city (see Calomiris et al. (2010) ). Firm-level control variables are all the time-series average values over the corresponding period. The sample period is from 1992 to 2008. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, disturbance terms clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote the coefficient estimates significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Regressions in columns (1), (7), (8), and (9) from Table 5 show that stronger local property rights protection attenuates the A-B share discount, with or without firm-level characteristics. The effect is statistically significant at 1% to 5% significance level, depending on the exact specifications.
The economic effect of local property rights protection is sizable. For example, the standard deviation of the A-B share discount in the full sample period is about 0.10. As shown in column (9), compared to firms with below median local property rights protection, firms with above median local property rights protection reduce A-B share discount by about 0.0865.
Between two proxies of firm opaqueness, special profits (to total income) and political connections, a higher level of special profits is associated with a higher A-B share discount (significant at a 1% level). A one-standard-deviation increase of special profits to total income increases the A-B share discount by 0.033, or 0.33 standard deviations.
Smaller firms (measured by total asset size) and older firms on average have a larger A-B share discount. The relative liquidity of underlying shares (measured by A-share turnover to B-share turnover) does not seem to explain the cross-sectional variations in the A-B share discount.
Subsample Evidence
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 Columns (3) to (5) of Table 6 estimate the following regressions:
Ref orm t is a binary variable, which equals one for all observations after B-share market 2001 reform, and zero otherwise. In column (3), property rights protection is a continuous variable;
and in columns (4) and (5), property rights protection is a binary variable, taking value of one if the property rights protection index value of the city where the firm is incorporated is above the cross-sectional median, and zero otherwise. ). Property Rights Protection is the city-level local property rights protection index value based on the World Bank Survey (2006). In columns (1) through (4), Property Rights Protection takes a continuous value. In column (5), Property Rights Protection takes a value of one if the property rights protection index value is above the median value in the cross section, and zero otherwise. Reform is an indicator variable taking a value of one for all observations after 2001, and zero otherwise. Log(GDP Per Capita) is the time-series average of inflation-adjusted city-level gross domestic product per capita in RMB. GDP Growth Rate is the time-series average of inflation-adjusted city-level gross domestic product per capita growth rate. ROE is the return on equity of the underlying issuer. Log(Total Assets) is the logarithm of the value of total assets in RMB. Log(Age) is the logarithm of the firm age since the founding date. Log(Turnover Ratio) is the logarithm of A-shares turnover ratio to B-shares turnover ratio. Return Difference is the difference between A-share annual returns and B-share annual returns. Independent Director is the ratio of independent directors to all directors. State Ownership is the proportion of shares held by the state and state legal persons to total shares outstanding. Special Profits is the ratio of non-operating profits to total profits. Political Connection is an indicator variable denoting that the firm has at least one senior officer who was ever a mayor or vice mayor of a city (see Calomiris et al. (2010) In summary, through the de facto and de jure cash flow channel, the "cash flow hypothesis"
can potentially explain the relationship between the level of property rights protection and A-B share discounts. However, the "cash flow hypothesis" runs into difficulty explaining the effect of property rights protection on return comovement. If information acquisition costs are irrelevant, it is difficult to imagine that in the presence of the same set of information about future cash flow, discount, dividends and default likelihood, A-and B-shares should adjust to such value relevant news differently in a systematical way.
Nevertheless we carry out the following empirical exercises. First, for each stock in our sample, we carefully check the dividend payment history, both regular dividend and special dividend, for A-and B-shares. We cannot find a single incidence in which A-and B-share investors receive differential treatment in dividend payments. Second, if one argues that foreign investors may be discriminated by the local court in the bankruptcy process, then the effect of property rights protection on A-B share discount and comovement should be more pronounced among firms with higher likelihood of default.
To test this idea, we obtain firm-level expected default frequency (EDF) from Moody's-KMV, and ask the question whether firms with higher EDF are likely to experience larger discount and lower return comovement when the local property right protection is weak, , i.e., this alternative story suggests a positive interaction effect between PRP and EDF. 14 Specifically, we estimate the following regressions for the full sample, before the reform, and after the reform:
ρ(A i , B i ) = α + β 1 × P RP i + β 2 × P RP i × High EDF i + β 3 × High EDF i
The EDF measure is estimated from a modified framework of the structural model in Merton (1974) to incorporate the complexity of capital structures in the real business environments. More importantly, the distance to default measures calculated from the modified Merton's model are mapped to the physical probabilities of defaults, using the empirical distribution of the real defaults. For an overview of the EDF credit measure, see Crosbie and Bohn (2003) . A recent study by Correia, Richardson, and Tuna (2011) compares different predictors of default, and find that EDF provided by Moody's-KMV outperform other default predictors. where High EDF equals one if the firm's EDF value is above median, and zero otherwise. Estimation results are provided in Table 7 . Columns (1) to (3) show that the interaction term between the level of PRP and High EDF has no effect on return comovement no matter which sample period we use. This suggests that the difference between de facto and de jure cash flow rights does not explain the cross-sectional and time-series variation in return comovement. Table 7 reports the tests of cash flow hypothesis as an alternative explanation. In regressions (1) to (3), the dependent variables in all regressions are market-adjusted A-B share return comovement, defined as the A-and B-shares return correlation of firm i, minus the median of B-share return correlations with other B-shares of firm j, ji. The other variables are the same as in Table 2 . In regressions (4) to (6), the dependent variables in all regressions are A-B share discount, defined as the logarithm of one plus the time-series average of B-share price minus A-share price to B-share price or log(1 + P B −P A P B
). The other variables are the same as in Table 4 . EDF is the firm-level average EDF provided by Moodys-KMV.
Moreover, this is not an artifact of lack of statistical power in our empirical tests. Interestingly, when we look at the B-share discount in columns (4) to (6), we find that the interaction term positively and significantly affects this discount before 2001, i.e., firms located in cities with worse PRP index have lower B-share price relative to A-share price, and this effect is stronger when the default likelihood is higher; while this effect disappears after 2001. A plausible interpretation is that before B-share reform in 2001, because there is a perfect segmentation of the market, it is easier for the local courts to discriminate against foreign investors. After the reform, because both domestic and foreign investors trade B-shares, it is technically more difficult for the local courts to discriminate against foreign investors.
Overall our evidence suggests that while the difference between de facto and de jure cash flow rights may explain relative pricing of A-B shares, it does not explain the pattern of return comovement.
Conclusions
Legal and economic institutions -such as property rights protection and accounting transparency -affect investors' incentives and costs of acquiring information. In this paper, we study the link between property rights protections (PRP) and asset prices. We build a simple dynamic REE model with market segmentation where asset prices depend on both innovations in firm-specific fundamentals and noise trading shocks, which are partially correlated across investor classes. The relative contribution of these shocks into price fluctuations, and thus the correlation between different securities, depends on the capitalization of firm-specific information into prices. The model predicts that firms from cities with low levels of PRP exhibit relatively low correlation between different class of shares issued by the same firm, and relatively high correlation among the same class of shares across different firms.
Empirically, relying on some unique institutional features in the Chinese stock market, we study the return comovement and relative pricing of two classes of shares with identical voting rights and cash-flow rights but for different investor clienteles. This design allows us to almost perfectly disentangle non-fundamental comovement from fundamental comovement. We first document a surprisingly low return comovement between the A-and B-shares of the same firm, which is even lower than the average B-share correlations with B-shares issued by a different firm.
We find that local investor PRP of the city where the issuer is incorporated, and several firm opaqueness measures such as special profits and political connections, explain the cross-sectional variations in the low A-B share return comovement. However, we find no evidence that either property rights protection or firm opaqueness can subsume one another to explain the cross-sectional variation in the A-B share return comovement. We interpret the evidence that supports the view that firm opaqueness is one channel through which investor protection affects investor acquisition of firm-specific information. The intra-country firm-level evidence complements prior cross-country evidence in Morck et al. (2000) and Jin and Myers (2006) , and provides further empirical support for the proposed theoretical model. As an identification strategy, we exploit a regulatory change in Chinese capital markets in 2001 that allows domestic investors to purchase B-shares and perform a difference-in-difference analysis. We find that after the partial market integration, comovement increases; further, the increase in comovement is more prominent for firms located in cities with poorer property rights protection, which is consistent with Veldkamp's (2006) information acquisition model: For firms that have relatively small information acquisition costs (i.e., in cities with better property rights protection), their prices already aggregated a large chunk of firm-specific information before the reform in 2001, thus the entry of domestic investors, and their associated information sets, become less important or valuable for pricing efficiency.
Finally, we also find that local investor property rights protection and firm opaqueness explain the relative pricing of A-B shares (i.e., the "A-B share discount puzzle"). The B-share discount is much less pronounced for firms incorporated in cities with stronger property rights protection and more transparent firms. The evidence presented in this paper complements the finding in Chan et al. (2008) and illustrates that property rights protection and firm opaqueness affect the relative pricing of A-B shares through the channel of information acquisition costs. 
